Category Archives: Child Suport – Guidelines

Marriage of Smith v. Lambouths

Circuit court reasonably exercised its discretion when it imposed child support under the straight percentage formula and ordered mother to pay all variable expenses where parties had engaged in substantial litigation.

State v. Sullivan

Providing an apartment, phone service, cable television, cleaning, travel expenses, a leased vehicle and a per diem, plus payment of the “gross up” that he would have pay for taxes are not legitimate business expenses and therefore should be included in income for child support.

Vlies v. Brookman

Unless the court deviates from the percentage guidelines, it must set family support at an amount that results in a net payment after taxes of no less than the child support calculated under the guidelines.

In Re Marriage of Rumpff v. Rumpff

Trial court had discretionary authority to not apply shared time formula where it recognized the potential for future litigation over variable expenses. Trial court also correctly concluded that placement until 7 p.m. does not constitute “equivalent care”. Equivalent care must be something of substance – not just an evening meal.

In Re Marriage of Maritato v. Maritato

(a) Sunday placement until 7:30 p.m. is not the equivalent to overnight care. (b) Disparity in disposable incomes does not in and of itself make the application of the percentage standards unfair. However, trial court was required to perform an analysis of the relevant statutory factors.

In Re Marriage of McLaren v. McLaren

Trial court erred by ordering husband to pay half of child care expenses without finding a deviation from the standards.

In Re Marriage of Zawistowski v Zawistowski

Court had an erroneous understanding the shared-time formula. The court cannot order parties to split variable costs as an alternative to ordering child support.

In Re Marriage of Richmond v. Richmond

Court must state in writing or on the record why the use of the percentage standards would be unfair and the reasons for the deviation.

In Re Marriage of Randall v. Randall

The shared-time formula is part of the presumptive percentage standard where the payer has the requisite number of overnights or the equivalent.

In Re Marriage of Hokin v. Hokin

Court properly applied shared time placement formula. (fn. 2 at 190). Trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in imputing retirement benefits to wife for purposes of child support.

State v. Alonzo R.

Standards are presumptive, not mandatory. Court need not consider all statutory factors, only those relevant to whether a deviation is warranted. Trial court properly deviated from standards based on unique circumstances of the case, including ability to pay.

In Re Marriage of Evenson v. Evenson

Trial court properly exercised its discretion in shared time place where the court did not base support on a fixed number of additional overnight equivalents.

State v. Wall

Court properly found that it would be unfair to include vacation trips, awarded to father by his employer, in gross income as the trips could not be readily converted into cash and do not enhance the payor’s financial means to make child support payments.

In Re Marriage of Weis v. Weis

Court erred in imputing income from farmhouse, as father does not have control over the house. Similarly, the court erred in including his share of undistributed partnership profits, as he does not have authority to unilaterally mange the partnership. However, the court properly included the partnership payments of health insurance premiums for his benefit, as the constitute gross income under the federal tax code.

In Re Marriage of Raz v. Brown

Trial court affirmed for determining that payor did not meet his burden of proof that use of the standards was unfair where payee’s income ($114,516) exceeded payor’s income ($108,384) and there was a significant disparity on disposal income after support.

Brad Michael L. v. Lee D.

(1) Trial court erred in deviating from standards because of lack of knowledge of child’s existence and consequent inability to provide for or visit with child. This is not a statutory factor. (2) Trial court erred in using marital property law to determine payor’s income. (3) Trial court erred in deducting depreciation from gross income (4) Trial court should have considered possible imputed farm income.