Evidence of substantial change in circumstances was overwhelming. Several factors would “probably have qualified for a substantial change in circumstances.”
Nonmodifiable floors on child support are enforceable as long as they are no longer than 33 months.
Contempt order affirmed where payor (who was a lawyer) did not disclose interest in class action lawsuit and did not report a substantial change in income. (Not published, but citable)
Stipulation limiting ability to seek a modification of family support is against public policy and cannot provide a basis for estoppel.
Trial court properly ordered retroactive child support where Husband failed to make proper financial disclosure.
Restrictive child support provisions are against public policy. Further, a substantial change of circumstance occurred when James received placement of one of the children; therefore, the trial court properly entertained the motion to modify child support.
Stipulation making future child support unmodifiable in the event of a change in placement is against public policy and void. However, stipulation forgiving arrearages is not contrary to public policy.
While a trial court can consider incarceration when as a basis for a request for a modification in child support, the fact of incarceration by itself neither mandates nor prevents modification.
Change in placement schedule in and of itself is not a substantial change in circumstances warranting a modification of child support.
The expiration of 33 months is a rebuttable presumption, but is not conclusive of a substantial change in circumstances. Here, the evidence did not show a substantial change.
No reduction in child support was an appropriate exercise of discretion where payer over withheld from his income to avoid paying support and had been receiving a veterans benefit which had not been included in his gross income.
Where divorce was in Virginia, mother and child now live in Wisconsin, father lives in Delaware, Wisconsin cannot modify child support under UIFSA based on payor’s request.
Trial court cannot modify child support because order should have been based on a serial family payer. The order may have been in error, but it is not an error in calculation.
Child support agreement with a floor violated public policy where the agreement is not time limited and has no opportunity for review.
Legislative changes did not curtail the discretion of the court to set aside DHSS standards. Even though more that 33 months had passed, the child support agreement was still serving the needs of the child and was still fair to the parents.
Change in an administrative regulation alone does not constitute a substantial change in circumstances allowing modification of child support.
Trial court properly exercised its discretion in not applying guidelines in modification hearing where parties did not use them at the divorce and the support ordered was sufficient to support the children.
RURESA order in Pennsylvania did not modify prior Wisconsin child support order and Wisconsin order continued to run.
Court did not misuse discretion by failing to use guidelines in modification case where payor was expending more than what the law might ordinarily require of a high income obligor.
(1) Two tier orders does not apply as percentage standards are mandatory on modification (2) Decision by father to return to school was reasonable (3) Children benefit by more than just dollars – financial compensation is not exclusive factor (4) Rental income should be offset by costs.