In Re Marriage of Novotny v. Novotny
Trial court can look at transcript of agreement as stated in court to ascertain the intent of the parties. (Not published, but citable.)
Trial court can look at transcript of agreement as stated in court to ascertain the intent of the parties. (Not published, but citable.)
Stipulation providing for non-modifiable maintenance continue past payor’s death, even though it is not expressly stated in the stipulation.
Stipulation for property benefit for adult children is enforceable. Parties may freely and knowingly stipulate to an overall settlement that is fair and equitable and not against public policy and such a judgment is enforceable by contempt sanctions.
Because Frisch v. Henrichs (2007 WI 102) and Krieman v. Goldberg, 214 Wis. 2d 163, have declared restrictive child support provisions similar to the one here against public policy, we determine that the provision at issue here is against public policy, and we decline to apply equitable estoppel against James.
Stipulation freezing child support was unenforceable because it was not in the best interests of the children and therefore contrary to public policy.
Stipulation making future child support unmodifiable in the event of a change in placement is against public policy and void. However, stipulation forgiving arrearages is not contrary to public policy.
Trial court erred in finding that child stipulation was percentage-based: The language “The monthly amount of $400 (17% of current income of $28,000/year”) is unambiguously a dollar expressed order and that the dollar amount is based on husband’s wages.
There is no right to withdraw from a stipulation after court approval. Court approval does not require a written judgment – court’s expression of its decision to adopt the stipulation is sufficient.
Trial court has authority to construe an ambiguous judgment to effectuate the trial court’s intent. Here, the judgment is not clear on the meaning of “gross income”. Therefore the trial court had the authority to clarify what it intended and its construction was reasonable in light of the entire record.
Marital stipulation was unambiguous that wife agreed to assume a proportionate share of gains and losses from husband retirement. Judicial economy would be ill-served by permitting a judicial reallocation of loss.
A settlement agreement which allows for maintenance to be modified only for increases violated public policy, so equitable estoppel does not apply. Wife would only get increases without sharing in the risk and, unlike a stipulation which has a nonmodifiable fixed amount or term, this one-sided agreement invites litigation.
Wife is estopped from seeking extension of maintenance where stipulation stated that there “would be no extensions.” The estoppel doctrine applies even though there was not a “comprehensive settlement of all …issues” Estoppel applies where the parties have resolved all other issues concerning the divorce before agreeing to the stipulation for which estoppel is sought.
Wife is estopped from seeking extension of maintenance where stipulation stated that there “would be no extensions.” The estoppel doctrine applies even though there was not a “comprehensive settlement of all …issues” Estoppel applies where the parties have resolved all other issues concerning the divorce before agreeing to the stipulation for which estoppel is sought.
There are two types of agreements: Those which are mutual contracts and those which are concessions of facts. The second type is a procedural convenience to relieve a party of having to prove a fact. Here, the husband conceded a fact, his earning capacity. This was not a stipulation because both parties did not agree to it.
Button only applies to agreements made before or during marriage which contemplate a continuation of the marriage relation. Agreement signed after divorce was filed was a divorce stipulation and is controlled by Ray v. Ray, 57 Wis. 2d 77 (1973), and either party could withdraw from it until it was incorporated into the judgment.
Where parties stipulation sets out that maintenance is to be determined by wife’s schedule C income, court cannot rewrite a clear and unambiguous contract.
Stipulation resolving custody/placement issues which provided that it would be included in F & Js was intended to reflect the final resolution, unlike an interlocutory agreement which can be disavowed.
Mutual release in divorce agreement surrenders or waives husband’s option to purchase marital interest in company stock.
General recitation of contract law, specifically what constitutes a meeting of the minds and oral contracts.
Stipulation was not ambiguous, specifically payments were maintenance and thus stop on remarriage.